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Abstract
Following major criminal cases in the food system, such as the Horsemeat and 
fipronil egg scandals, the phenomenon of food fraud has emerged as a priority 
concern for supranational (e.g. European Union) and domestic policymakers and 
regulatory authorities. Alongside this, there is increasing interest from academics 
working in both the natural and social sciences (but rarely together), where we see 
common and overlapping objectives but varied discourses and orientations. Conse‑
quently, various framings about the nature, organisation and control of food fraud 
have emerged, but it is not always clear which of these are more reflective of actual 
food fraud realities. This article analyses three key areas in the literature on food 
fraud where we see fault lines emerging: 1. food fraud research orientations; 2. food 
fraud detection and prevention (and the dehumanisation and decontextualisation 
associated with analytical testing); and, 3. food fraud regulation and criminalisation. 
We argue that these fault lines raise questions over the plausibility of knowledge on 
food frauds and in some cases produce specious arguments. This is significant for 
food fraud policy, strategy and operation, in particular in terms of how we generate 
expectations about the actual realities of food fraud and corresponding actions that 
are realised, and make knowledge practically adequate.
Introduction
As a policy and social scientific construct, food fraud has in recent years gained 
momentum as a major global issue. This is primarily due to a series of major cases 
and scandals, such as the adulteration of beef products with horsemeat that came 
to light in 2013, the fipronil in eggs scandal that emerged in 2017, or the slaughter 
of sick cows for human consumption in 2019, all within the European Union (EU), 
and the need to ‘do something about it’. Consequently, the phenomenon of food 
fraud has emerged as a priority concern for supranational (e.g. EU) and domestic 
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policymakers and regulatory authorities. Alongside this policy concern, there is 
increasing interest from academics working in the natural and social sciences (but 
rarely together) with research driven by their varying conceptual and theoretical 
(and sometimes commercial) agendas or intentions, resulting in conversations with 
themselves or those who are like‑minded. For instance, amongst others, criminol‑
ogists, sociologists and socio‑legal scholars foreground the making of food fraud 
rules, how and why such rules are broken, and the public–private responses to the 
breaking of these rules. Biological scientists and biotechnologists focus on food 
authenticity and identifying discrepancies in the DNA of foodstuffs that might indi‑
cate frauds have taken place. Business and management scholars examine the integ‑
rity of food supply chains and processes, and the security of foods within trading 
networks, and improving resilience to frauds. Within such scholarship, we see com‑
mon and overlapping objectives, such as the need to reduce or prevent food frauds, 
but varied narratives and framings about the nature, organisation and public/private 
control of food fraud have emerged within science (and policy), but it is not always 
clear which of these are more plausible reflections of food fraud realities than oth‑
ers, and in some cases fault lines are appearing that undermine what we know about 
food frauds (and how we know it) that can lead to specious or (intrinsically and/or 
extrinsically) political claims.
Unconnected scientific conversations are partly responsible, but also a symptom 
of disciplinary disjunctures, yet at the centre of all these agendas is an objective 
recognition of food frauds as criminal and/or non‑compliant behaviours (although 
the foregrounding of different concepts e.g. food fraud, food defence, food safety 
inevitably implies the posing of different research questions (see [1]). But how do 
varied disciplinary or policy accounts reflect food fraud realities? Which representa‑
tions of food fraud and its control are more adequate than others, on the basis that 
they explain more of the phenomenon under study? One approach is to scrutinise 
the plausibility and practical adequacy of the knowledge produced. All knowledge is 
fallible and the open system nature of the social world makes redundant attempts to 
establish absolute truths about particular crimes and criminal phenomena. So think‑
ing in terms of how useful particular knowledge is, in terms of how food frauds and 
its control are understood, and reflecting on the research framings, orientations and 
methodological approaches utilised to generate this knowledge, can assist in direct‑
ing us towards which knowledge is more useful in any given context, such as for 
enforcement or regulatory interventions.
As Sayer [2: 69] explains, [t]o be practically adequate, knowledge must generate 
expectations about the world and about the results of our actions which are actu‑
ally realized’. In line with this, ‘[t]he aim of critical criminology is in part to assess 
the practical adequacy or objectivity of different social constructions and this task 
assumes a degree of objectivity of the social phenomenon in question’ [3: 346].1 
Consequently, in terms of internal validity, to what extent do varying accounts of 
food fraud provide epistemic gain and is such knowledge a plausible account of 
1 For more in‑depth insights into critical realism as a philosophy of social science see Bhaskar [4] and 
Sayer [2], and in relation to its application in criminology see Matthews [3, 5] and Edwards [6].
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reality within the contexts analysed that can inform practice, making sense to the 
context from which it is drawn and to the individuals (e.g. enforcement/regulatory 
actors) that operate there? In other words, by plausibility, we consider the ways in 
which the orientations and methods pursued, often as a reflection of disciplinary 
intentions, produce knowledge that simply reflects the chosen method and focus, or 
whether it reflects the reality of food frauds. In terms of practical adequacy, we con‑
sider whether the knowledge that is produced is useful for particular purposes, such 
as food fraud detection, prevention or control.
In line with the above, this article analyses three key issues (not an exhaustive 
list) in the literature on food fraud where we see fault lines emerging in relation to 
the knowledge produced. We focus primarily on the UK context, but the arguments 
have relevance to the EU more widely and beyond. First, we analyse orientations in 
food fraud research, arguing for greater reflexivity in methodologies and concep‑
tual frameworks to reduce the likelihood of research findings being an artefact of 
the methods and data used, rather than reflecting the reality of food frauds. Here, 
we also examine food fraud framings, and specifically the depiction of the extent 
of food frauds as episodic and exceptional, arguing for the need to incorporate the 
routine and mundane frauds within business, and dive deeper into the underlying 
generators of such frauds. Second, we consider food fraud detection and prevention, 
and the foregrounding of analytical testing as the solution, arguing that this dehu‑
manises and decontextualises social and situated fraudulent actions, and has limited 
applicability. Third, we focus on the tensions inherent in the regulation and crimi‑
nalisation of food frauds. We do not offer a comprehensive or exhaustive examina‑
tion of all areas of contention, but drill down into specific issues that we consider 
to be of significance. There is also overlap between the three sets of fault lines we 
discuss. However, we argue that these fault lines raise questions over the plausibility 
of knowledge on food frauds and in some cases produce specious arguments. This is 
significant also for food fraud policy, strategy and operation, in particular in terms 
of how we generate expectations about the actual realities of food fraud and corre‑
sponding actions that are realised, and make knowledge practically adequate.
Fault lines in research orientations
In relation to the discipline of criminology, Cohen [7: ix] argued there are three 
orders of reality. First, the object of study, or the ‘thing’ itself, that is, crime and 
the apparatus for its control—in this case, ‘food fraud’. Second, research and spec‑
ulation about this thing, that is, how we describe, classify, theorise, explain and 
develop normative and technical solutions to crime (or ‘food fraud’) as a ‘problem’. 
Third, reflection about the nature of the whole enterprise itself. Thinking in terms 
of the interplay between these three levels of reality allows us to critically reflect 
on the food fraud literature and assess what we know, think we know (based on the 
methods we use), and/or need to know, about the nature, extent and control of food 
frauds.
The research literature on food fraud is sparse when compared to other types 
of fraud (e.g. credit card frauds, corporate frauds, investment frauds, and other 
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‘organised frauds’) though fraud research generally also remains at the margins of 
academic and criminological inquiry when contrasted with the analyses of varied 
volume crimes, such as anti‑social behaviours, property crime or interpersonal vio‑
lence, or even serious and organised crimes. For instance, a search for articles on 
varied frauds published in Crime, Law and Social Change indicates that four have 
been published on ‘food fraud’ (two of which involve the current authors), 30 on 
‘credit card fraud’, 23 on ‘corporate fraud’, and 16 on ‘investment fraud’, with 41 on 
‘anti‑social behaviour’, 40 on ‘interpersonal violence’ and 157 on ‘property crime’.2 
This is a crude and superficial analysis, but indicative of the academic attention 
devoted to food frauds in a journal with a strong reputation for publishing related 
research.
This lack of attention reflects (at least) three issues: first, a lack of, or ambigu‑
ous, ownership of food fraud cases and enforcement as regulatory fragmentation 
leads to disinterest or inabilities (due to resource and prioritisation) in taking on 
food fraud cases, despite emerging policy narratives reinforcing the market and con‑
sumer harms of such frauds (although deaths are rare); that, second, leads to reduced 
(or narrowly targeted) funding for research aiming to analyse the actual nature and 
underlying generative and real causes of fraud within the food system; and, third, 
the research difficulties in accessing food fraud networks as whoever is involved in 
the frauds, from seemingly legitimate food system businesses to entirely illegitimate 
organised crime groups, and all those in‑between, do not generally permit access to 
outsiders such as researchers. These methodological and data issues are part of the 
reason for variably plausible accounts of food fraud as they reduce the valid data 
available on the motivations and drivers of those actors, who either in a pre‑planned 
manner or more reactively, are able to visualise and capitalise on opportunities for 
fraud. Similarly, measuring the extent of food fraud is notoriously problematic due 
to a lack of authoritative data and methods with which to measure fraud across sec‑
tors and jurisdictions. Estimates of global trade in counterfeit food and drink range 
from $6.2bn to $40bn [8: 1]. But these estimates have little meaning given the dif‑
ficulties in quantifying the extent of food frauds, but also do not include the costs of 
enforcement, the costs to businesses in improving their compliance systems, or the 
costs of changes in consumer behaviours.
The aforementioned concerns lead to a first fault line. Due to the above limita‑
tions, depictions of food fraud and ‘food fraudsters’ in the academic and policy liter‑
ature (and media) is mostly reliant on known cases that have come to the attention of 
domestic (e.g. the UK’s National Food Crime Unit) or regional (e.g. EU Food Fraud 
Network, the EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), or EUROPOL’s 
OPSON reports) enforcement actors. Whilst known cases can be an appropriate 
analytical starting point for understanding the nature and organisation of particular 
offences, using such data (even if caveats are recognised) to develop representative 
accounts (e.g., patterns and trends of fraud) is beset with limitations as our under‑
standings begin to reflect the activities and agendas of enforcement rather than the 
2 Search undertaken on the CLSC website on 11 February 2021.
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realities of the phenomena. As Gussow [9] evidences, the willingness and abilities 
of enforcement agencies dictate which food frauds are discovered.
In research terms, this means there is a major absence of systematic and robust 
empirical investigation into the nature of food frauds, their victims and harms, with 
studies unable to plausibly instantiate theories and typologies of the ‘food fraud‑
ster’ beyond offering abstract propositions (that may be valid but not empirically 
robust). Consequently, many academic studies draw on anecdotal evidence of indi‑
vidual cases, or rely on enforcement data, to put forward concepts and explanations 
of such offending, and in turn advocate control and policy solutions (including our 
own earlier work). For instance, studies have analysed reported cases over time to 
identify trends and patterns of food fraud offending types, leading to conclusions 
about certain types being more prevalent than others and such findings seemingly 
providing an evidence‑base for targeted interventions and future scientific research. 
But in line with Cohen’s [7] observations, such accounts are artefacts of the data and 
methods used, leading to constructions of the ‘thing’ to be a product of the research, 
rather than a reflection of reality. These accounts may of course be accurate, but the 
lack of rigorous data undermines their practical use and reflects an inherently flawed 
logic, and the implications for control responses and research funding calls are clear 
as resources may be misdirected.
New and varied data are needed to inform our undertanding of food fraud. The 
absence of such data in part reflects the relatively new scientific interest in the topic 
and as such the rich, in‑depth qualitative and ethnographic accounts of offending, or 
the large‑N quantitative self‑report and victimisation surveys that we see with other 
areas of crime have not yet emerged. However, there are notable examples that do 
develop new social scientific quantitative and qualitative data on food crimes and 
food fraud where the findings and insights reflect the methods used. For example, 
van Ruth et al. [10], drawing on the routine activities theory informed SSAFE food 
fraud vulnerability assessment tool,3 interviewed actors from food sector businesses 
to gain insight into the drivers and enablers of fraud in varied supply chains; Yang 
et  al. [11, 12] undertook interviews and a survey, again drawing on the SSAFE 
tool, to assess fraud vulnerabilities to the milk supply chain in the Netherlands and 
China as perceived by industry actors, Kendall et  al. [13] use focus groups with 
middle‑class Chinese consumers to understand attitudes, perceptions and beah‑
vioural responses towards food fraud. These studies also represent rare examples 
of integrative and collaborative research teams from the social and nature sciences 
to make sense of the multi‑dimenstionality at play in particular food fraud related 
phenomena.
In line with Cohen, more reflection on the process of food fraud research and 
subsequent accounts would offer a more critical and plausible take on what we 
know about food fraud and why certain agendas and approaches that construct the 
nature of the food fraud problem can be more a product of the research process and 
the intrinsic politics of disciplines. This is necessary for both analytical reasons, 
that is, developing multi‑faceted and reflexive accounts of food fraud realities and 
3 See https:// www. ssafe‑ food. org <last accessed 11 February 2021>.
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practical reasons, that is, informing enforcement, regulatory and business compli‑
ance responses.
Following on from this, a second fault line relates to the focus of inquiry in 
food fraud research as weak empirical data or policy/enforcement constructions 
in turn drive subsequent research and corresponding framings. With this in mind, 
academic scholarship tends to focus food fraud research in two ways; 1. towards 
food fraud ‘acts’; and 2. towards food fraud ‘actors’. Table 1 outlines the features 
of these foci of inquiry in food fraud research as based on our understanding of the 
field. In essence, these varying foci are coterminous, in that the ‘thing’ under study 
relates to ‘the abuse or misuse of an otherwise legitimate business transaction and 
an otherwise legitimate social/economic relationship in the food system in which 
one or more actors undertake acts or omissions of deception or dishonesty to avoid 
legally prescribed procedures (process) with the intent to gain personal or organiza‑
tional advantage or cause loss/harm (outcome)’ [14: 611]. Although separated here, 
both foci can be integrated in research and can offer rich insights into particular 
Table 1  Foci of inquiry in food 
fraud research
Foci of inquiry Key features
Food fraud acts (and harms) Foregrounding specific types of 
violation and behaviour e.g., 
adulteration, mislabelling, 
substitution etc. and associated 
harms
Can be based on state definitions 
(i.e., law violations, whether 
criminal or regulatory) or 
informed morality (i.e., exchang‑
ing criminal definitions for 
moral definitions)
Policy/research portrayals risk 
foregrounding certain acts as 
sensational and episodic, rather 
than also highlighting the routine 
and mundane harms that exist
Food fraud actors Foregrounding ostensibly vari‑
able legitimate and illegitimate 
offender types encompassing 
e.g., individual ‘rogue’ actors/
businesses, organised crime 
groups, legitimate businesses 
(SMEs and corporate), state‑
corporate actors
Actor preoccupation downplays 
‘organisational’ dynamics 
and situational, structural and 
systemic drivers by individualis‑
ing accounts of food fraud and 
in turn not highlighting food 
frauds that are culturally embed‑
ded regulatities within food the 
system
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manifestations of food frauds and of those involved but within each research orien‑
tation, significant disjunctures have emerged, and this has implications for how we 
understand the reality of the nature of food frauds. In both cases, research might be 
driven by concerns with particular food fraud targets (e.g., very specific foodstuffs 
and products) and industries (e.g., red meat or fish) but with little systematic evi‑
dence (or intelligence) as to why such targets have been selected.
Food fraud acts and harms
In terms of a focus on specific ‘acts’ of food fraud and their associated harms, con‑
cern lies with the nature of the act (or omission), the characteristics of the fraudulent 
methods and the defining features of the particular behaviours. These acts are usu‑
ally in line with state defined violations of criminal and regulatory laws, such as 
intentional frauds or other food laws (see [15], for an overview of food fraud legal 
frameworks in the UK and EU). That said, attempts have also been made to broaden 
scope away from legal violations to a focus on harmful acts to incorporate breaches 
of morality and ethics (see [16: 12]) where we see focus also on those ‘lawful but 
awful’ [17] behaviours of corporate elites such as misleading food packaging, con‑
tributing to widespread obesity, or food poisoning (see [18: 41–45]). In research 
terms, ambiguity in relation to legal status ought to be embraced as the ‘problem’ 
of food fraud cannot be ‘solved’ through attempted categorisation as ‘crime’ or ‘not 
crime’, as the areas of contestation and controversy makes them sociologically of 
interest. Whether social scientists frame their focus of inquiry in terms of narrow, 
legalistic definitions of food fraud, or broaden their focus to also incorporate var‑
ied harmful behaviours, it is vital in either case that clear conceptual parameters for 
their research orientations are developed. ‘Food fraud’ is in some ways a ‘chaotic 
conception’, or ‘bad abstraction’ (see [2: 138–139]), in that ‘it’ integrates together 
unrelated and inessential objects and relations, for example, assuming that those 
involved in the adulteration of foodstuffs behave similarly to those involved in the 
counterfeiting of alcohol, and this creates issues for explaining and responding to 
such activities. We see this with predominant policy conceptions that explain var‑
ied food frauds almost always as being economically motivated, which neglects the 
social complexity of human behaviours [14]. Thus, researchers must ensure their 
concepts reflect objects and relations of study that are internally related in order for 
their research to be clear and meaningful.4
Integrating the sensational with the mundane
Food frauds usually come to public attention, often in the news media, as sensa‑
tional, exceptional, or ‘newsworthy’ events that are damaging to consumers, other 
businesses, and the wider public. Prominent examples have included the 2008 mela‑
mine milk scandal in China that resulted in six deaths and 50,000 hospitalisations. 
4 See also Goodall (this issue) on contentless abstractions in relating to ‘poaching’ and ‘organised 
crime’.
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More recently, cases such as the 2019 slaughter of sick cows in Poland have brought 
into question governments’ abilities regarding traceability of food supply networks, 
and generated significant public and academic attention on the way in which food 
products are sourced, handled, and overseen. While these exceptional events are 
important in their own right, they tend to be associated with somewhat haphazard 
and reactive policy responses that are not necessarily implemented effectively in 
order to reduce vulnerability to food frauds. For instance, the UK National Food 
Crime Unit (NFCU) was established in 2015 largely as a consequence of the 2013 
European horse meat incident, yet such regulatory agencies are typically under‑
resourced and part of a more complex and fragmented enforcement context [8: 4]. 
In consequence, the rhetoric and high profile of exceptional events have the potential 
to influence food fraud policy, and in turn direct scientific research in a ‘knee‑jerk’ 
reaction way that has not necessarily considered the nature and extent of the full 
range of frauds that occur across societies.
Policy and research accounts of food fraud must be wary of framing and por‑
traying food fraud acts as exceptional and episodic events that are detached from 
otherwise licit, functional, and unproblematic market or business processes. This 
obscures routine and mundane frauds generated by the structure and dynamics of 
the food system and market [14, 19, 20]. The extent and scale of food frauds are 
not binary issues, as related behaviours exist on spectrums of greater or lesser fre‑
quency, and greater or lesser severity and harm. Foregrounding of the exceptional 
and episodic, whether in the media, policy or research, is problematic as it normal‑
ises routine frauds that are considered not to be ‘newsworthy’ or deserving of policy 
attention due to their less severe or prominent nature and ensures policy, in the UK 
specifically, continues to foreground concepts of food safety and food authenticity 
[21]. We see this elsewhere, for instance, where concerns over adulterated avocado 
oils in the US [22], non‑compliant raw drinking milk suppliers in New Zealand 
[23] and the closing of fraudulent ketchup factories by the Punjab Food Author‑
ity [24], receive notably less media or policy attention when compared to scandals 
such as the 2013 European horse meat incident. When taken as separate events, this 
inconsistent attention is perhaps understandable, since some individual cases will 
inevitably be more ‘newsworthy’ than others due to factors such as who the victims 
are, the severity of consequences or how widespread the fraud was, both in terms of 
geographic scope and number of actors involved. However, this attention on sensa‑
tionalist cases risks detaching individual cases from the standard, routine business 
processes within which they occur.
Focusing on routine and embedded instances of food fraud is important in order to 
understand the full scope of underpinning processes that occur within the spheres of 
business, industry, regulation, and policy‑making. van Ruth et al. [25] outline key fac‑
tors associated with food fraud vulnerability in licit markets, including opportunities, 
motivations, and control measures, which intersect with standard business practices 
including opportunities (both technical and in time and space), economic drivers, cul‑
ture and behaviour, as well as technical and managerial control measures. An analysis 
of the Spanish olive oil market by Lord et al. [26] showed that understanding situational 
actions in conjunction with ‘entrepreneurial’ activity can be an important cornerstone 
of preventing and tackling food fraud that is embedded within business structures. In 
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addition, if left unchecked, routine food frauds could become more frequent or severe 
in the event of limited accountability, which highlights the importance of ensuring that 
mundane cases are given sufficient attention. The desire by researchers, industry and 
policy makers to appear to be taking action against sensational events ultimately serves 
to obscure embedded practices within industry that also warrant attention. The key 
concern is that the drift towards the exceptional, sensational and episodic depicts an 
unbalanced account of the reality of food frauds, and downplays the complexity that 
underpins the occurrence of food frauds, and both these issues in turn undermine the 
practical adequacy of knowledge that is produced for increasing understanding and 
informing policy and enforcement.
Food fraud actors
In terms of a focus on the ‘actors’ involved in food frauds, studies in this orienta‑
tion foreground the characteristics of the actors involved in the offending, seeking to 
highlight distinctive features such as part of an ‘organised crime group’, or business 
‘rogues’ (usually individuals). For example, Elliott [27: 6] concluded in his review 
of the integrity of supply networks that ‘[f]ood fraud becomes food crime when it no 
longer involves a few random acts by ‘rogues’ within the food industry but becomes an 
organised activity perpetrated by groups who knowingly set out to deceive and or injure 
those purchasing a food product’. He goes on further to state ‘[b]ut the serious end of 
food fraud is organised crime, and the profits can be substantial’ [27: 12]. This framing 
is problematic for two main reasons. First, it implies food frauds are predominantly car‑
ried out by individual actors, whether people or businesses, and whether internal indus‑
try actors or external ‘organised crime groups’, downplays the organised deviant activi‑
ties of large corporate players within the food system, in some cases with the collusion 
of the state (see [20, 28]), and the market dysfunctionality that creates opportunities for 
fraud across and within food networks and trading relations (see [14]). Second, it sug‑
gests food frauds are random and in some way episodic and exceptional (see above), 
rather than sustained and embedded practices within the food industry that are harm‑
ful in the aggregate. One key issue is that whoever becomes involved in the frauds, a 
necessary aspect of all cases is involvement in some form of legitimate business envi‑
ronments and transactions, hence more can be gained from analysing food fraud as an 
endogenous phenomenon of the food system [14]. In addition, Gussow [9] argues that 
motives and gains are often misleadingly conflated. In other words, actors’ intentions 
and motivations are often reduced to simplistic economic rationality, neglecting the 
diversity of incentives that offenders might encounter, and in turn producing unsophis‑
ticated successionist accounts of what motivates food fraud offenders, and this under‑
mines the practical adequacy of reductionist accounts.
Integrating agency and structure through the lens of the market
One further issue that arises from the individualisation of food fraud offenders is 
that regulatory approaches target potential actors instead of focusing on the struc‑
tural conditions—market structure, complexity of supply chains, contractual 
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arrangements—that create ready‑made structures for the commission of crimes in 
the system. A consequence of individualising food frauds, or embedding strategic 
responses within the policy discourse of ‘serious and organised crime’, is the per‑
ceived necessity by states to criminalise responses at the level of these individual 
events rather than address the real, deeper mechanisms that enable such crimes to 
occur. It may also be effective to develop systematic assessments such as script anal‑
ysis, to identify the particular antecedents and factors that come together to enable 
frauds to take place, and situational prevention, in order to reduce vulnerability to 
food fraud in the short term (see [26]). These assessments would enhance opportuni‑
ties for researchers, industry practitioners, and policy makers to proactively try to 
prevent food fraud from occurring in the first place.
The key issue is that individualising food frauds diverts attention from systemic, 
embedded, and cultural regularities associated with business, market, regulatory and 
political‑economic structures. For instance, as above, reducing explanations for food 
frauds to that of individual ‘rogue’ criminals and/or organised crime groups patholo‑
gises food frauds as distinct criminal activities that bear little or no relation to other‑
wise routine and legal organisational processes. Food frauds are regularly depicted 
as perpetrated by external crime groups who operate transnationally and threaten 
the integrity of otherwise robust food systems [14]. This depiction is reflected both 
at a media and policy level, where headlines such as ‘Crime gangs expand into food 
fraud’ [29] dominate, and where enforcement agendas have targeted efforts against 
food fraud at the economic goal‑based activities of organised crime groups [30]. 
This narrative may be convenient for governments as they reduce demands for struc‑
tural and cultural reforms to dysfunctionality in the food system. Yet enforcement 
bodies such as the UK NFCU continue to assert that whilst there are exceptions, 
there does not appear to be any consistent organised crime activity in food fraud, 
with food crimes commited by those with existing roles in the food system [31: 22], 
[32: 6]. Simultaneously, however, the NFCU’s response strategy has now fallen in 
line with the UK Home Office’s Serious and Organised Crime Strategy [33: 1], and 
this has implications for the framing and response to food frauds in line with strate‑
gies developed in response to organised crime.
Analytically, more can be gained by integrating research questions about inter‑
actions of individual agency and offender collaborations with the emergence and 
visualisation of opportunity structures generated by the structures of the food sys‑
tem, including business processes, regulation, markets, and their political‑economic 
governance. Multi‑dimensional accounts are key to understanding the social com‑
plexity of food frauds and this involves embracing the tensions that exist across var‑
ied disciplines. For instance, long (and transnational) supply chains, supply chains 
with multiple intersections, large multi‑national companies with opaque ownership 
structures, low cost food production and food processing of cheap food residues all 
contribute to food fraud opportunities. Pressures within particular industries, such 
as narrow profit margins, the nature of business relationships between farmers and 
buyers, as well as how easy it is to tamper with specific products, all contribute to a 
richer understanding of how and why food frauds occur within otherwise legal busi‑
ness settings. Relatedly, food fraud also has political consequences. Governments 
must constantly ensure that they can deliver food cheaply—there is an interplay 
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between cheap food, food production and government approaches to food regula‑
tion that have emerged and are influenced by particular geo‑historicl contexts. In the 
UK, in the post‑Brexit period of rapid social change, we can anticipate a changes in 
regulation as food is sourced outside of EU regulatory framewors, creating spaces 
for fraudulent actions.
In these terms, germane to producing plausible and practically adequate knowl‑
edge is the foregrounding of the interplay between the emergence and visualisation 
of criminal opportunities, the networks of criminal actors and their respective skills, 
expertise and abilities, the control mechanisms in place and the varied settings, situ‑
ations and structural antecedents that shape the concentration or distribution of these 
varying causal factors. A multi‑faceted analysis of how food frauds emerge in par‑
ticular places and times, and of the diverse antecedents that shape this, offers a more 
concrete insight into why certain actors become involved in certain types of fraud 
under different conditions. Analyses of the structure of the market, and in particular 
clearly integrating analyses of how food is sourced, produced, distributed and mar‑
keted relate to criminal opportunities is needed, otherwise the above fault lines will 
remain in place.
Moving attention from sensational and individualised explanations in order to 
better understand routine, structural processes, are well‑grounded topics in the liter‑
ature on organisational and corporate crime. In this context, researchers foreground 
arguments that crimes and harms are routine and systematic by examining ongo‑
ing, enduring, complex relationships between private and public actors [34: 177]. 
In particular, Bernat and Whyte [35] argue that criminal and harmful actions should 
be analysed as part of broader processes and systems of production, rather than spe‑
cific ‘moments of rupture’ that serve to separate events from processes. A critical 
perspective may frame these system‑wide analyses as a product of industry struc‑
ture and vested business ownership and interests, but focusing on the food system at 
industry and organisational levels provides a more nuanced discussion when com‑
pared to explanations based solely on criminality or organised crime.
Fault lines in detecting and preventing food frauds
A second set of fault lines relates to how we detect and prevent food frauds, and in 
particular the reification of authenticity testing as the policy solution. For instance, 
in 2020 the UK’s Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) pub‑
lished a report on food fraud to inform ministers of the state‑of‑the‑art evidence 
on the issue, and based on a review of the literature and interviews with stakehold‑
ers from practice and academia, including natural and social scientists. In terms of 
detection and prevention, the report concluded that ‘[s]trategies to detect and pre‑
vent food fraud broadly fall into two categories: analysis to test the authenticity of 
foods to verify compliance with labelling and compositional standards, and broader 
mitigation strategies, such as intelligence gathering’ [8: 3]. The ‘broader mitigation 
strategies’ were essentially defined in terms of sharing anonymised information and 
authenticity test results. Such techniques can be targeted or non‑targeted, looking 
for specific DNA or adulterants, or obtaining biochemical footprints to compare 
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expected characteristics respectively. Such testing uses innovative technologies or 
specialist laboratories. Whilst in the UK detection and prevention, and intelligence 
sharing, is also a priority of the National Food Crime Unit, despite being established 
in 2014, the Unit is yet to receive sufficient statutory enforcement powers to investi‑
gate food crimes [36]. The key issue is that this high‑level POST review of the sci‑
entific literature foregrounded varying forms of authenticity testing as the primary 
solution to detecting and preventing food frauds. This is a dominant narrative in the 
food fraud academic discourse but whilst it seems appealing and actionable (particu‑
larly as such testing at the cutting edge is highly advanced), alone it is superficial 
and fundamentally flawed under a layer of surface plausibility.
Targets for testing are often very specific foodstuffs and products. These stud‑
ies often reflect anecdotal concerns from industry actors and/or regulators or reflect 
strategically haphazard or piecemeal attempts to identify the next food fraud scandal 
with no particular evidence base for targeting and testing particular products. [Food‑
stuffs may be chosen on the basis of perceived value, but some ‘cheaper’ products 
may be more frequently targeted (see [37, 38])]. This latter approach is common 
in the natural sciences, as food fraud studies move from one foodstuff to the next 
and utilise analytical techniques to test foods that may in some way be fraudulent. 
Business and industry have also foregrounded analyticial testing as food standards 
required more stringent authentication whilst varied organisations have also emerged 
seeking to offer (and commercialise) analytical testing solutions (for an overview see 
[39]). This of course has implications for the kinds of data shared by business with 
the NFCU. A key issue here is that by focusing on the product, fraudulent behav‑
iours are decontextualised and dehumanised, as products, and not the people who 
conspire to defraud them, become the focus of inquiry. Whilst such approaches can 
inform an understanding of which foodstuffs have been defrauded, they offer little 
robust insight into the actual underlying nature, organisation, drivers, conditions or 
motivations for the frauds and essentially lead to framing food frauds in relation to 
the intrinsic political decisions of researchers and their methods.
Dehumanising fraudulent behaviours
First, there is an issue of dehumanisation. The desire to frame testing as the solution 
is understandable from a policy perspective as it constructs an image of a ‘scientific’ 
approach to fraud detection and reduction. The key issue, however, is the absence of 
social science to understand the underlying human motivations and behaviours—
foods do not adulterate themselves, so focusing on the product and not the people 
can only be part of the solution. Depriving food fraud responses of the necessary 
human–social qualities, features and conditions, is pessimistic, failing to foreground 
behaviour change. Furthermore, as Gussow [9] identifies, routine compliance detec‑
tion mechanisms rarely detect food frauds alone, particularly as offenders can 
straightforwardly conceal their activities and circumvent inspection mechanisms. 
This is significant for those advocating routine (and random) analytical testing as 
a solution as such procedures are easy to deceive. Instead, much can be learned 
from the social scientific literature on fraud where we see plausible short‑term, 
1 3
Fault lines of food fraud: key issues in research and policy 
medium‑term and long‑term prevention and reduction strategies that incorporate 
admixtures of situational (e.g., improving capable guardianship in particular settings 
where motivated offenders interact with opportunities) and social prevention (e.g., 
pursuing systemic change to create fairer and more transparent food networks). Situ‑
ational prevention, for instance, implies the coming together of necessary mecha‑
nisms that enable the commissioning of food frauds, that is, understanding how food 
fraud occurs in different settings, understanding the modus operandi, understanding 
who is involved and when and why, understanding which actors have key roles in 
the network and so on., and then building in interventions that can i. increase the 
effort needed to carry out the fraud, ii. increase the risks associated with the fraud, 
iii. reduce the potential rewards from the fraud, iv. reduce provocations for the fraud, 
and v. remove excuses for carrying out the fraud. Lord et al. [26: 484], for instance, 
present ‘a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding food frauds as sit‑
uated actions, shaped by contingent enterprise conditions, and developing associated 
situational mechanisms to prevent and reduce these undesired, “entrepreneurial” 
behaviours at the level of necessity’. Similarly, van Ruth et  al. [25] argue for the 
systematic evaluation of vulnerabilities within the food system, consisting of devel‑
oping an evidence base on the opportunities, motivations and control measures to 
inform intervention and reduction strategies. Thus, as Spink and Moyer [40: R159] 
note, it is important to recognise that ‘the root cause of food fraud has fundamen‑
tally different properties’ to other policy agendas such as food safety.
Decontextualising fraudulent behaviours
Second, there is an issue of decontextualisation. Whilst analytical testing techniques 
claim to be able to detect fraud, such as adulteration, in reality such testing can at 
best detect that a fraud has taken place at some point previously in the food supply 
chain or system. In essence, such testing is an ‘after the fact’ response (identifying 
that certain foodstuffs were at some point defrauded), rather than a ‘before the fact’ 
response, seeking to prevent or reduce the number of frauds taking place. Analytical 
testing removes the context of the actual fraudulent activities and enterprise, pro‑
viding little insight into how such frauds would in fact be prevented. Whilst one 
counter‑argument may be that analytical testing is in itself a deterrent, and therefore 
preventative, there is no empirical evidence base for this. Furthermore, this assumes 
that it is possible to trace back from the point that fraud has been identified to the 
point where the fraud occurred, but complex food supply networks and associated 
food industry practices involving production, processing and distribution mean any 
evidential connections between the perpetrators and the fraudulent foodstuff are 
difficult to establish. For instance, a producer of burgers or lasagnes may source 
minced meat from multiple suppliers, domestically and internationally, mixing these 
ingredients to produce the final product. There may also be multiple layers of bro‑
kerage that take place along these supply chains, with ownership varying across and 
within jurisdictions. Thus, identifying that a burger in a UK supermarket had been 
adulterated will unlikely deter those engaging in fraud, particularly when there is a 
transnational component. Similarly, for such testing to act as a general deterrent, it 
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would need to take place at an unmanageably grand scale. For instance, in 2018 in 
the UK alone there were almost 90,000 restaurant and mobile food businesses (not 
to mention the hundreds of thousands of other food business types)—analytical test‑
ing across all such locations is simply not viable or cost beneficial.5
The scope of applicability
Third, there is an issue with the scope of applicability. Whilst analytical testing can, 
as above, target particular DNA sequences or search for particular characteristics, 
this is only relevant for a small part of the food fraud ‘problem’. Bouzembrak and 
Marvin [42], drawing on data from the EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF) established six different food fraud types: (i) improper, fraudulent, missing 
or absent health certificates, (ii) illegal importation, (iii) tampering, (iv) improper, 
expired, fraudulent or missing common entry documents or import declarations, 
(v) expiration date and (vi) mislabelling. Similarly, Manning [43] highlighted vary‑
ing areas where integrity, and potential frauds, might take place, such as in rela‑
tion to not only food products (i.e. quality/authenticity) but also food processes (i.e. 
activities inherent in production), people (i.e. honesty/morality of actors) and data 
(i.e. consistency and accuracy of accompanying information). With these typolo‑
gies in mind, analytical testing can inform questions about authenticity and quality, 
but struggles to identify where a product has been mislabelled (e.g., organic or not? 
Halal or not?), illegally imported, is missing required documentation, and so on. 
Thus, whilst academia and policy recognise a diverse array of behaviours that form 
food fraud (see also [21], for an overview of the evolution of the food crime/fraud 
concept), analytical testing can only be used to respond to a small segment of these. 
However, one implication of this narrow relevance of analytical testing is that such 
approaches nonetheless shape narratives around which foodstuffs are most suscep‑
tible to fraud (and consequently more frequently tested) making food fraud realities 
an artefact of testing regimes.
For knowledge on food fraud detection and prevention to be plausible and have 
real use for practitioners, it needs to reflect the reality of the dynamics of food fraud 
and not narrowly delineate or define such situated actions in terms of the constitution 
of foodstuffs. Analytical testing is not a panacea to food fraud but can undoubtedly 
be part of a more holistic and integrated human‑social‑technical detection, preven‑
tion and reduction strategy that incorporates public (e.g. enforcement authorities), 
private (e.g. robust business compliance systems and risk/vulnerability assessments) 
and civil society (e.g. increased education) actors in order to increase the integrity 
and resilience of the food system (see also [9]). However, the analytical testing com‑
munity, as we see in the UK POST report, is setting the research and policy agenda, 
5 See https:// www. stati sta. com/ stati stics/ 298871/ number‑ of‑ resta urants‑ in‑ the‑ united‑ kingd om/. See also 
the FSA, Annual Report on Local Authority Food Law Enforcement for England, Northern Ireland and 
Wales (1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019 [41]). According to this report, 62% of Trading Standards Local 
Authorities had around 10% of establishements awaiting for an initial inspection and 21% of Trading 
Standards Local Authorities had more the 20% of establishments not yet rated.
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based on assumptions about patterns and trends of food fraud, and depictions and 
portrayals, that reflect inferences based on problematic data and political agendas. 
This in turn confirms the centrality of the natural sciences in the understanding of 
a social phenomenon to the detriment of the social sciences. A consequence of this 
is that industry and public research funds are directed towards the testing industry 
that in turn serves to reinforce the testing approach. Moreover, shifting the agenda 
towards testing as the solution enables key industry players to claim a valid self‑reg‑
ulatory response whist deflecting the spotlight away from those structures, practices 
and cultures within the food system that generate increased inequalities and incen‑
tivse ‘creative’ business responses to external pressures and accompanying rationali‑
sations for this.
Fault lines in regulating and criminalising food frauds
The third set of fault lines relates to the criminalisation of food frauds given the 
enforcement tensions between crime control and a food law/regulation underpinned 
by safety concerns. Recent discussions for the standardisation of the definition of 
food fraud at the international (CX/FICS 18/24/7 [44]) and European (CEN/WS/086 
in European Commission website [45]) levels have defined food frauds as ‘inten‑
tionally causing a mismatch between food product claims and food product charac‑
teristics’, and as ‘any deliberate action of businesses or individuals to deceive oth‑
ers in regards to the integrity of food to gain undue advantage’, respectively. In the 
EU there is no legal definition for food fraud. However, the European Commission 
establishes that food fraud refers to ‘any suspected intentional action by businesses 
or individuals for the purpose of deceiving purchasers and gaining undue advantage 
therefrom, in violation of the rules referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 
2017/625 (the agri‑food chain legislation)’6. The agri‑food chain legislation, which 
entered into force in December 2019, broadens the scope of official controls on com‑
pliance with EU rules concerning not only the safety of foodstuffs and the integ‑
rity of food supply chains, but also includes animal and plant health, animal welfare 
and environmental issues. The European Commission has further established that 
the distinction between food fraud and non‑compliance is based on four operative 
criteria, i.e., violation of EU rules (specified in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 
2017/625), deception of consumers, intention and economic gain. These criteria 
limit the applicability of food frauds to those affecting consumers, but is silent about 
other potential victims such as business partners, in addition to reducing food frauds 
to those economically motivated and thus, is blind to an array of motivations that 
may be conducive to food frauds [14]. Despite its focus on regulatory compliance, 
the agri‑food chain legislation [under Article 9] requires competent authorities to 
provide information about those instances in which ‘consumers might be misled…
to the nature, identity, properties, composition, quantity, durability, country of origin 
or place of provenance, method of manufacture or production of food; and, further 
6 https:// ec. europa. eu/ food/ safety/ agri‑ food‑ fraud/ food‑ fraud‑ what‑ does‑ it‑ mean_ en <Accessed 3 
August 2021>
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identify the possible intentional violation of the rules’. In the absence of a statutory 
definition of food fraud, the agri‑food chain legislation attempts, through this provi‑
sion, to squeeze acts that could be conducive to frauds (and crimes) within a regu‑
latory framework aimed at identifying non‑compliance. However, the enforcement 
tension between crime control and regulatory breaches extrapolate not only from the 
lack (or inadequacy) of a statutory definition for food fraud, but also from complexi‑
ties arising from the fragmentation of competent enforcement authorities and legis‑
lation involved in food fraud investigations, as well as from the absence of necessary 
resources and expertise to investigate and successfully prosecute food frauds [15].
The UK, as the EU, lacks a statutory definition for food fraud. However, the 
NFCU has differentiated between food fraud and food crime, the latter defined as 
‘as a serious fraud and related criminality in food supply chains’.7 Despite this dis‑
tinction, the regulatory framework to address food‑related offences relies mainly on 
the General Food Law Regulation (EC) 178/2002 [46]8 and the Food Safety Act 
1990 [47], both of which developed as a response to safety concerns. For instance, 
in her analysis of the UK policy discourse on food crime, Rizzutti [21: 118], notes 
that ‘UK food policies have focused mainly on ensuring that food is safe and free 
from intentional and unintentional contaminations, without taking into considera‑
tion the possible illicit profiles of the practices that happen inside the food sector 
beyond food fraud activities’. Although the Food Law Code of Practice (England) 
2017 establishes that food crimes should be prosecuted under the Fraud Act 2006 
or as conspiracy to defraud under the common law, not all food frauds would be 
considered serious enough to pursue a fraud prosecution as opposed to strict liabil‑
ity offences under food law and regulations. Thus, food fraud prosecutions have to 
undergo a subjective test for seriousness based on the detriment to the public, busi‑
ness operators or the UK food industry, the geographical scope of the alleged fraud 
and the public or political sensitivities towards the case (Food Law Code of Practice 
(England) 2017 [48]). Including public and political sensitivities in the threshold of 
seriousness to prosecute a food fraud as a crime seems to respond to an understand‑
ing of food fraud as sensational and episodic (see above), and not as a result of routi‑
nised activities, culture within industries and the potential misuse and abuse of legal 
business structures for the organisation of frauds. In addition to this threshold, the 
NFCU, whose capacity was increased in 2018 to include both intelligence and inves‑
tigative powers (FSA 18‑06‑09 [49]), focuses only on seven types of food crimes: 
theft, illegal processing, waste diversion, adulteration, substitution, misrepresenta‑
tion and document fraud, limiting therefore the scope of food frauds to certain acts. 
The NFCU’s threshold, which determines the cases that fall within its new remit, 
is restricted to serious fraud and related criminality to prosecute under the Fraud 
Act 2006 or as conspiracy to defraud under common law, only leading on a ‘small 
number of the most serious and complex investigations’ which comprise strategic 
7 The EU General Food Law is applicable in the UK after the EU‑exit until the end of the transitional 
period on 31 December 2020. General Food Law will be retained as amended under the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018.
8 https:// www. food. gov. uk/ safety‑ hygie ne/ food‑ crime (accessed 15 February 2021).
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priorities (and control strategies), taking into account the geographical scope and 
scale of the alleged offence, and the extent and nature of the actual, potential or 
intended (physical or economic) harm (FSA 20‑01‑18 [50]). The NFCU will be able 
to support and/or coordinate investigations led by other partners,but, despite these 
new powers, the NFCU will continue to rely on other authorities, and on securing 
agreement with relevant partners, and the necessary changes to legislation to access 
powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, in order to ensure enforceabil‑
ity of food frauds both within and below their remit threshold. As the National Audit 
Office [36: 9] concludes, the NFCU ‘currently lacks the full range of investigative 
powers it needs to operate independently’, such as powers of search and seizure. 
The NFCU futher notes that the reduction of funding, and of food officers in some 
areas, will affect the collection of intelligence at the local level, thus affecting the 
UK intelligence concerning non‑compliance and food crime [32]. Limited resources 
and the complexity of the issues involved constraints the potential to conduct long 
and complex investigations and entails considerations about the best use of public 
funds [32]. Thus, whilst the Food Law Code of Practice (England) 2017 provides 
some guidance in terms of food fraud and food crime, the concept remains elusive 
within a regulatory framework that is geared towards strict liability offences and 
subjected to a set of criteria that limits the categorisation of deviant conducts as food 
crimes [15].
Assumptions about the actors are reflected on regulatory approaches such as the 
FSA’s new ‘Regulating our Future [51]’, which aims to segment business operators 
according to ‘risk scores’ in order to determine the nature, frequency and intensity 
of official controls, and where the role of the Primary Authority System is being 
considered to form part of this regulatory approach (FSA website). The Primary 
Authority is a scheme under which the food business operators enter into partner‑
ships with local authorities, who in turn help businesses comply with regulation. 
The operation of the system will determine the national inspection strategies in 
which the Primary Authority can establish lower and more tailored regulatory inter‑
ventions for food business operators based on evidence. Whilst this approach seems 
more targeted, big corporate food groups and business operators with resources 
would be more likely to enter into partnerships with the local authority and thus, 
have a more targeted regulatory approach. Reports have shown that big group organ‑
isations with a considerable market share can incur in regulatory breaches that are 
not detected or acted on even when subjected to regulatory and private audits (The 
Guardian, 2 March 2018 [52]), raising concerns about the inadequacy of some pri‑
vate quality schemes and regulatory audit systems (based on the categorisation of 
businesses for inspection) to detect non‑compliance (UK Parliament [53], 2017 
[54]). The FSA’s regulatory approach is based on cooperation and information shar‑
ing to establish targeted responses; however, this approach assumes that businesses 
are willing to cooperate and act responsibly. Furthermore, enforcement authorities 
would need to have the necessary resources both in terms of finance and expertise to 
identify and investigate food fraud and food crimes within a fragmented regulatory 
framework foregrounding safety, guided by conceptualisations that are restrictive 
about the potential actors and acts, and where only a limited number of food frauds 
are considered serious enough to be prosecuted as a crime, and investigations led by 
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the NFCU. The tensions between the regulatory framework and the criminalisation 
of food frauds epitomise the prevalent understanding that food frauds are external to 
the food system and episodic, characterised as specific acts, restricting the plausibil‑
ity of food fraud comprising an array of motivations beyond this confined types of 
food fraud. In order for a regulatory framework to adequately prevent, detect and 
control food fraud, there is a need to better understand the motivations (from slip‑
pery rope, to attempts to keep a business afloat, to normalisation of behaviours in 
certain industries), and opportunities (deriving from financial, business, market, reg‑
ulatory, political, economic and cultural structures) behind the commission of food 
frauds.
Finally, the framing of the food fraud ‘problem’ as discussed above has driven 
the creation of investigative bodies or departments such as the NFCU in the UK (we 
see this also in many countries including Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark) 
that are structured as criminal investigative units and often staffed with (ex‑)law 
enforcement actors with varying enforcement powers, depending on jurisdiction. 
Ostensibly, this seems a plausible policy response given the foregrounding of food 
crime in domestic (e.g. [27]) and EU discourse (e.g. CoEU, [30]) that in turn gives 
due attention and recognition to the phenomenon. However, the structure and staff‑
ing of such investigative units (i.e. the law enforcement model) predisposes them 
to pursuing criminal offending as exceptional acts by individual actors, as doing so 
reflects ‘cop culture’ and catching of ‘bad guys’, and justifying investment and fund‑
ing through the completion of notable cases (e.g. major seizures of counterfeit alco‑
hols). Doing so is of course important but the key issue is that, as above, this directs 
attention away from structural and cultural reform of the food system more generally 
to identify, for example, alternative models of ownership (as we see with coopera‑
tive groups rather than corporatised and commodified suppy networks) that can offer 
better protections to food system actors, reducing opportunities and incentives for 
fraud that are generated by industry practices and structures.
Conclusion: plausibility and practical adequacy
This article argues that there are fault lines emerging within the scientific and pol‑
icy literature on the nature, extent and control of food frauds, and in some cases 
specious constructions of the phenomenon driving research and policy agendas. 
With focus mainly on the UK context, and certainly not an exhaustive selection of 
issues, we analysed three sets of fault lines. First, we examined orientations in food 
fraud research in relation to the foregrounding of food fraud acts and actors. There 
is an over‑reliance on enforcement data in the development of food fraud concepts 
and realities, with corresponding research methods producing what constitutes the 
‘thing’ itself and with a neglect of the need for reflexivity of our methodological 
preferences. Relatedly, we critiqued depictions of the extent of food frauds as epi‑
sodic and exceptional, and as a product of exogenous threats to the food system. 
The concern with such depictions is that they obscure the diverse array of food 
frauds that are embedded within the food system, but which are perceived as more 
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mundane and routine. Alongside this, literature that individualises the occurrence of 
food fraud neglects and diverts attention away from a deeper empirical investigation 
of the systemic, embedded, and cultural regularities associated with business, mar‑
ket, regulatory and political‑economic structures that drive fraudulent behaviours. 
Second, we questioned the relevance of analytical testing as the solution to food 
fraud detection, prevention and reduction. In our view, foregrounding such testing 
dehumanises and decontextualises the multi‑faceted antecedents and complexities of 
food frauds as situated actions. Whilst analytical testing has some use as part of a 
broader control response, its scope of applicability is narrow. Third, we highlighted 
issues relating to the criminalisation of food frauds and in particular the tensions 
that exist between crime control and regulation, and the different legal responses 
that these models imply.
To conclude, our key purpose is to argue that the fault lines identified in this arti‑
cle raise significant questions over how plausible different accounts (and associated 
knowledge production) of food frauds actually are, and draw attention to the rela‑
tionship between science and policy, and the tensions that exist. In our view, this is 
significant for food fraud policy, strategy and operation, and for how we generate 
expectations about the actual realities of food fraud and corresponding actions that 
are realised, and make knowledge practically adequate. We encourage the pursuit of 
new and alternative empirical data in this field, that is reflexive and critical of the 
approach to producing knowledge on food fraud, and that in turn is able to inform 
robust conceptualisation and abstraction, and provide insights into the underlying 
social structures and relations that create mechanisms that enable, or restrict, oppor‑
tunities for, and actual occurrences of, food frauds as part of social complex food 
systems. This requires the coming together of varied disciplines, and the embracing 
of tensions that exist between and within the social and natural sciences, to produce 
multi‑dimensional accounts of the nature, organisation and control of food frauds.
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